I am a PhD candidate in Health Economics at Stanford University. Before Stanford, I have extensive experience in the healthcare industry starting as a McKinsey consultant, and most recently as Senior Vice President of Market Strategy with Optum/UnitedHealth before joining academia. I received my MPH in Health Policy from Harvard University.

Laurence C Baker (co-P)

Alvin E Roth (co-P)

Muriel Niederle (co-P)

Working Paper

• Best Paper Award (First Prize): 2022 Essen Health Conference

• All-California Labor Economics Conference Outstanding Poster Award

• Invited Talk, Rising Stars in Market Design (University of Tokyo)

This paper provides evidence that customer discrimination in the market for doctors can be largely accounted for by inaccurate stereotypes and deniable prejudice. I evaluate customer preferences in the field with an online platform where cash-paying consumers can shop and book a provider for medical procedures based on a novel experimental paradigm called validated incentivized conjoint analysis (VIC). Customers evaluate doctor options they know to be hypothetical to be matched with a customized menu of real doctors, preserving incentives. Racial discrimination reduces patient willingness-to-pay for black and Asian doctors by 12.7% and 8.7% of the average colonoscopy price respectively; customers are willing to travel 100–250 miles to see a white doctor instead of a black doctor, and somewhere between 50–100 to 100–250 miles to see a white doctor instead of an Asian doctor. Further, providing signals of doctor quality reduces this willingness-to-pay racial gap by about 90%, which suggests that statistical discrimination is an important cause of the gap. Willingness-to-pay penalties on minority doctors are multiples of actual average quality differences. This field evidence rejects statistical discrimination as the source of the observed discrimination in favor of behavioral mechanisms like stereotypes. Actual booking behavior allows cross-validation of incentive compatibility of stated preference elicitation via VIC. 

Deep learning algorithms to identify documentation of serious illness conversations during intensive care unit admissions

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• Editor's Choice Paper

Other Working Papers

Regulation of Organ Transplantation and Procurement: A Market Design Lab Experiment

With Alvin E. Roth (submitted)

Emergency Care by Female Doctors and Reduced Mortality

Regulation of Pharmacy Benefit Managers: A Market Design Lab Experiment

Priority and Prejudice: A Case of Mistaken Identification

Teaching evaluation: 5.0 out of 5.0

Fall 2017, Harvard University, Head Teaching Assistant

Teaching evaluation: 4.7 out of 5.0