I am a PhD candidate in Health Economics at Stanford University. Before Stanford, I have extensive experience in the healthcare industry starting as a McKinsey consultant, and most recently as Senior Vice President of Market Strategy with Optum/UnitedHealth before joining academia. I received my MPH in Health Policy from Harvard University.

Health Economics, Market Design, Experimental and Behavioral Economics, Economics of Discrimination and Diversity, Labor Economics


Laurence C Baker (co-P)


Alvin E Roth (co-P)

Michelle Mello

Muriel Niederle (co-P)

Working Paper

  • All-California Labor Economics Conference Outstanding Poster Award

  • Invited Talk, Rising Stars in Market Design (University of Tokyo)

This paper provides evidence that customer discrimination in the market for doctors can be largely accounted for by inaccurate stereotypes and deniable prejudice. I evaluate customer preferences in the field with an online platform where cash-paying consumers can shop and book a provider for medical procedures based on a novel experimental paradigm called validated incentivized conjoint analysis (VIC). Customers evaluate doctor options they know to be hypothetical to be matched with a customized menu of real doctors, preserving incentives. Racial discrimination reduces patient willingness-to-pay for black and Asian doctors by 12.7% and 8.7% of the average colonoscopy price respectively; customers are willing to travel 100–250 miles to see a white doctor instead of a black doctor, and somewhere between 50–100 to 100–250 miles to see a white doctor instead of an Asian doctor. Further, providing signals of doctor quality reduces this willingness-to-pay racial gap by about 90%, which suggests that statistical discrimination is an important cause of the gap. Willingness-to-pay penalties on minority doctors are multiples of actual average quality differences. This field evidence rejects statistical discrimination as the source of the observed discrimination in favor of behavioral mechanisms like stereotypes. Actual booking behavior allows cross-validation of incentive compatibility of stated preference elicitation via VIC. 


2021, New England Journal of Medicine 385: 766-768

2020, JAMA 323(3): 278-279

With Kevin Schulman

2020, JAMA Health Forum 1(3): e200291

(1st author) With Isabel Chien, Edward Moseley, Saad Salman, Sarah Kaminer Bourland, Daniela Lamas, Anne M Walling, James A Tulsky, Charlotta Lindvall

2019, Palliative Medicine 33(2): 187-196

Other Working Papers

With Alvin E. Roth (submitted)

2021, Stanford Health Policy Working Paper

Implementation of liver exchange using algorithm from this paper (in progress): Liver Exchange: A Pathway to Increase Access to Transplantation

Works in Progress

Emergency Care by Female Doctors and Reduced Mortality

Regulation of Pharmacy Benefit Managers: A Market Design Lab Experiment

Why Can You Buy a Body but Not a Kidney? An Experiment on Repugnance Conveyance

With Kurt Sweat

Priority and Prejudice: A Case of Mistaken Identification


BIOS 203: Market Design and Field Experiments for Health Policy and Medicine

Fall 2021, Stanford University, Primary Instructor

Teaching evaluation: 5.0 out of 5.0

HPM 206: Economic Analysis

Fall 2017, Harvard University, Head Teaching Assistant

Teaching evaluation: 4.7 out of 5.0